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The recent advances in wireless communication have led to the problem of growing
spectrum scarcity. The available wireless spectrum has become scarcer due to
increasing spectrum demand for new wireless applications. The large portion of the
allocated spectrum is sporadically used leading to underutilization of significant
amount of spectrum. To improve the spectrum efficiency, the idea of cognitive radio
technology was introduced. This concept of cognitive radio provides a promising
solution for the spectrum scarcity issues in wireless networks. Meanwhile, the security
issues of cognitive radio have received more attentions recently since the inherent
properties of CR networks would pose new challenges to wireless communications. In
this MS thesis, general concepts of security threats to the cognitive radio networks are
briefly reviewed. Performances for primary user emulation attacks are studied from
Neyman-Pearson criterion point of view. A novel system model with different
configurations of the primary users has been proposed and studied. Our experimental
results demonstrate the statistical characteristics of the probability of false alarm and
miss detection in the proposed system. I will make performance comparison with
others’ research in the future.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Background
The recent development in wireless communication has led to the problem of growing
spectrum scarcity. Due to increasing spectrum demand for new wireless applications
the available radio frequency spectrum has become scarcer. A significant amount of
allocated radio frequency spectrum is used sporadically, causing underutilization of
spectrum. Cognitive radio technology provides a promising solution for the spectrum
scarcity issues in wireless networks. It allows the efficient use of the finite usable radio
frequency spectrum. In cognitive radio terminology, Licensed users/Primary users are
defined as users who have right to use the spectrum band whereas unlicensed
users/Secondary users are defined as users who can use the spectrum which is
temporarily not used by licensed users, without causing interference to them. At the
same time, the security concerns of cognitive radio have received more attentions as the
inherent properties of CR networks would pose new challenges to wireless
communications. In cognitive radio network, an attack can be defined as an activity that
can cause interference to the primary users or licensed users [2]. In this dissertation we
also provide a brief explanation of most of the attacks that make use of one of the
inherent properties of cognitive radio.
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1.2 Benefits of Cognitive Radio Network
Why cognitive radio?
Spectrum is the lifeblood of communication systems. Without spectrum there is no
electromagnetic communication. The radio frequency spectrum is the medium between
the transmitters and receivers in wireless communication. The US spectrum is managed
either by the FCC for non-governmental applications or by the NTIA for governmental
applications [32]. As shown in Fig. 1.1 the radio frequency spectrum is characterized
into different frequency bands. The frequency spectrum ranging from 300 kHz to 535
kHz is used for aeronautical and maritime communications and the frequency spectrum
from 535 kHz and 1605 kHz is used for AM radio. The radio spectrum is becoming
scarce due to the increasing growth of the wireless communication technology and the
high requirement of capacity and date rates for various applications. We know that the
amount of useable spectrum is limited. Due to vast improvement in wireless technology,
radio spectrum will no longer be available for allocation for new services. Following
Fig. 1.1 shows the radio frequency spectrum allocation in United States.
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Figure 1.1 Radio frequency spectrum allocations in United States [21].

Figure 1.2 Spectrum Utilization [5].
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From Fig. 1.2 we can conclude that significant portion of allotted spectrum is unused.
There are portions of assigned spectrum that are concentrated in certain geographical
areas. Certain portion of the wireless spectrum is unutilized. Studies reveal that a
straightforward reuse of this unused radio frequency spectrum can provide an
improvement in available capacity. Now the issue is not that spectrum is scarce – the
issue is that we do not have the technology to effectively access the unused or wasted
spectrum. This unused frequency spectrum can be used and accessed in an
opportunistic manner by the secondary user. This gave a rise to new technology called
“cognitive radio”.

What is cognitive radio?
“A radio frequency transceiver designed to intelligently detect whether a particular
segment of radio spectrum is in use and to jump into and out of temporarily unused
spectrum very rapidly without interfering with the transmission of other authorized
users. Cognitive radio enables secondary user to sense which portion of spectrum are
available, select best available channel, coordinate spectrum access with other users
and vacate the channel when a primary user reclaims the spectrum usage rights"[31].
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Primary
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PU

Unused Band

SU

Figure 1.3. Cognitive radio Scenario [35]

Spectrum Sensing is a key step used in cognitive radio network. Basic requirement of
cognitive radio is to scan the radio frequency spectrum and determine fallow bands
which can be used in an opportunistic manner to increase spectrum efficiency [2]. The
most efficient way to identify white space is to detect primary users. Primary user
network & secondary user network are physically separate from each other. Secondary
users do not get direct feedback from the primary users about their transmission. So in
order to detect primary user transmission the secondary users have to depend on their
sensing ability to [2]. Spectrum sensing is one of the most challenging issues in
cognitive radio systems and has gained new aspects with cognitive radio and spectrum
access concepts. Following are the features of cognitive radio [33],
 Frequency agility: It is the ability of a radio to change its operating frequency.
 Dynamic frequency selection: It is the ability of a radio to sense signals from
nearby transmitters in order to choose best operating conditions.
 Location awareness: Determine its location, determine permission to transmit,
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select parameters such as power, frequency allowed etc.
 Adaptive Modulation: Ability to modify transmission characteristics.
 Transmit power control: constrains the transmitter to a lower level to allow
greater sharing of spectrum.

 Cognitive radio Cycle

Channel
Capacity

Spectrum
Analysis

RF Stimuli
Spectrum holes

Transmitted
Signal

Radio
Environment
RF Stimuli

Spectrum
Decision

Spectrum holes
Information

Spectrum
Sensing

Figure 1.4. Cognitive radio cycle [34]

In cognitive radio cycle a cognitive radio scans the radio frequency spectrum, gathers
information, and then identifies the vacant channels. Through spectrum sensing the
properties of the vacant channels are evaluated. Then, the appropriate spectrum band is
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chosen according to the spectrum characteristics and user requirements. The
communication can be carried out after determining the operating frequency band. The
four main functions of cognitive radio are as follows,
 Spectrum sensing: Spectrum sensing allows the CR users to adapt to the
environment by detecting spectrum holes without causing interference to the
primary network. One of the primary requirements of a cognitive radio is that, it
should scan the radio frequency spectrum and identify “white spaces” [1].
 Spectrum decision: After sensing the frequency spectrum and identifying the
“white spaces” Cognitive radio user should decide which frequency spectrum is
the best among the available bands according to the Qos requirements for the
applications. [1].
 Spectrum sharing : “Since there may be multiple cognitive radio users trying to
access the spectrum, network access should be coordinated to prevent multiple
users colliding in overlapping portions of the spectrum” [1]. Spectrum sharing
can be classified as centralized or decentralized spectrum sharing, Cooperative
or non-cooperative, overlay or underlay.
 Spectrum mobility: One of the primary requirements of cognitive radio is that, it
should vacate the licensed band when the primary transmitter reappears and
should search for another vacant frequency band in order to carry out its
transmission. Thus spectrum mobility is defined as the ability of CR user to
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switch between spectrum bands when the channel condition becomes worse or
the primary user reappears.

 Cognitive Radio Network Architecture
This section provides a detailed description of the CR network architecture.
Spectrum band

Unlicensed band

CR User

Licensed band I

Primary base
station

Primary
network
access

Primary User
CR
network
access

Licensed band II

CR ad hoc
access

CR User

Primary User

Primary networks

Cognitive radio
network (without
infrastructure)

Cognitive radio
network (with
infrastructure)

Figure 1.5. Cognitive radio network architecture [1].

CR base
station
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According to the architecture, cognitive radio networks can be classified as Centralized
or Distributed networks. According to operations point of view, cognitive radio
networks can be classified as licensed band operation and unlicensed band operation.
According to Access type, cognitive radio network can be classified as CR network
access, CR ad-hoc access, and primary network access.
 Centralized cognitive network: As shown in Fig. 1.5, the network is
infrastructure oriented. A base station is used to manage each CR user in the
network. The base station communicates directly with each user and controls
the medium access and the secondary users in the network.
 Distributed cognitive network: As shown in Fig. 1.5, the CR users
communicate with each other in an ad-hoc manner. Information is shared
directly between the secondary users who fall within the communication range;
otherwise information is shared over multiple hops.
 Licensed band operation: This band is dedicated for the primary users in the
network. It can be used by the unlicensed user if not occupied by the primary
user. CR user must vacate the licensed band if the primary user reappears then
and move to another vacant spectrum band.
 Unlicensed band operation: The unlicensed users have the same right to use
the unlicensed band. There is no need to vacate the spectrum for the licensed
users.
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 Cognitive radio network access: As shown in Fig. 1.5, the cognitive users can
share information with their base station on the licensed as well as the
unlicensed spectrum band.
 Cognitive radio ad-hoc access: As shown in Fig. 1.5, the cognitive users in the
network can share information with each other in ad-hoc manner on both the
licensed and unlicensed spectrum band.
 Primary network access: As shown in Fig. 1.5, the CR users can also
communicate with the primary base station on the licensed spectrum band with
an adaptive medium access control protocol.

1.3 Security issues in cognitive radio
In comparison with traditional wireless networks, there are more chances open to
attackers in cognitive radio technology. As a result, security in cognitive radio networks
has become a challenging task. Quality of service (QoS) provisioning and security
requirement for the entire network may be adversely affected by these weaknesses and
vulnerable aspects, introduced by the nature of cognitive radio [3]. Many general
schemes proposed in the past cannot satisfy such special network requirements, since
the spectrum is used dynamically in cognitive radio.

Cognitive radio network is similar to wireless network. Since the nature of the wireless
media is open air, it is more vulnerable to attacks as compared to that of wired network.

11

The data in the wireless media may be eavesdropped or altered without notice and the
channel might be jammed or overused by the adversaries. The cognitive radio
technology opens more chances to attackers due to its intrinsic nature [3].

Inherent reliability Issues
Certain inherent reliability issues of cognitive radio networks are discussed [2].
 High Sensitivity to primary user signal:

The secondary users should

identify the primary transmission in order to prevent interference to the primary
users. One of the stringent requirements for cognitive network is to predict the
temperature interference on nearby primary receiver and keep it below a
threshold. As a result of this the sensitivity towards the primary user signal is
usually set to high. In case of energy based detection this high sensitivity
increases false detections.


Unknown primary receiver Location: The secondary user must know

where exactly the primary receiver is located, so that the interference to primary
user is minimized. Unknown primary receiver location may lead to hidden node
problem. By exploiting the receiver power leakage, the location of primary
receiver can be identified.
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1.4 Summary
In this chapter we have given a brief description about how cognitive radio technology
provides a promising solution for the spectrum scarcity issues in wireless networks. We
have outlined the benefits of cognitive radio, the cognitive radio cycle, cognitive radio
architecture. We have also discussed about the security issues in CR networks.
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Chapter 2. Overview of security Threats in
Cognitive Radio Networks
2.1 Security and its requirements
Attack always accompany with the security system, since security and attack interacts
with each other. The main objective of the security system is to protect the
communication from the malicious users. The cognitive radio network has the same
security requirements as that of the general wireless networks because of the open air
nature of wireless media [3]. The major difference between the cognitive radio network
and the traditional wireless network is that it doesn’t operate on a fixed frequency
spectrum i.e. the frequency spectrum is being used dynamically. While implementing
security scheme in CR network various factors need to be taken into consideration
because cognitive radio deals with the use of unused spectrum in an opportunistic
manner with the unscheduled appearance of the primary users. In the following section
we consider each protocol layer and the attacks associated with it.

2.2 Security at different layers
In this section we will briefly describe the attacks associated with the five layers in the
protocol stack i.e., the physical layer, link layer, network layer, transport layer and
application layer [2][3].
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 Physical layer
Physical layer is the lowest layer and it provides an interface to the transmission
medium. Cognitive radio network doesn’t operate on a fixed frequency that is signals
can be transmitted and received at various frequencies across wide frequency spectrum
band. The frequency spectrum is used dynamically. Thus, this makes the operation of
physical layer in cognitive radio more complicated. Spectrum sensing is a key part
cognitive radio, since it deals with identifying vacant bands or spectrum holes.
Following are the possible attacks associated with physical layer.
 Intentional jamming attack

The malicious secondary user intentionally transmits signal in a licensed band and jams
primary and other secondary users. The problem would be worse when the malicious
mobile node launches attack in one geographical area and moves to another area before
being identified [3].

Attack

Figure 2.1. Intentional jamming attack [3].
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 Primary receiver jamming attack

Since the secondary user does not know the location of the primary receiver, the
attacker can take advantage of this to launch a primary receiver jamming attack. For an
example, the attacker may move closer to the primary receiver and requests
transmission from the secondary users towards it. This will in turn cause interference to
the primary receiver [3].

Licensed user
Attack

Figure 2.2. Primary receiver jamming attack [3].
 Primary User Emulation Attack (PUE or PUEA)

A malicious user can imitate the primary user, other secondary user in the network
believes that the primary user reappears and they terminate their communication and
release the frequency band. This prevents the secondary users from accessing that band
[3].
 Overlapping secondary user attack

In cognitive radio networks, multiple secondary networks may exist at the same time
over the same region. The transmissions from malicious entities in one network can
cause interference to the primary and secondary users of the other network. Since the
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malicious users or attackers may not be under the direct supervision of the secondary
base station of the victim network, this type of attack is very difficult to prevent [2].

Attack

Figure 2.3. Overlapping secondary user attack [3].

 Link layer
Link layer sits just above physical layer in the protocol layer stack. This layer is
responsible for transfer of data from one node to other in single hop. It ensures that
initial connection has been set up, divides output data into data frames, and handles the
acknowledgements from a receiver that the data arrived successfully. The MAC layer
which controls channel assignment, is one of the important sub layers of the link layer.
One of the important parameters to decide the fairness of a channel allocation scheme
in traditional wireless environments is SNR. On the contrary, in cognitive network
various parameters such as holding time, delay, Path loss, interference and link error
rate are as important as the SNR. Hence channel assignment is a more complex
operation in cognitive radio networks [2][3].
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 Biased utility attack

A malicious secondary node may try to change the parameters of utility function in
order to increase its own bandwidth. As a result of this the good secondary user is
deprived of available bandwidth.
 False feedback attack

In a decentralized cognitive network, secondary user may make wrong decision due to
false feedback from one malicious secondary user. This in turn will cause severe
interference to the licensed user. For an example, a malicious node in the network may
not tell the other secondary users in the network about the reappearance of the licensed
user, who cannot sense the information due to fading or long distance. Such an attack is
called as false feedback attack [2] [3].
 DOS attack

The main objective of malicious node is to prevent good secondary nodes from
accessing the vacant radio frequency band. An attacker may try to jam a network and
thus reduce a legitimate user’s bandwidth, prevent access to a service, or disrupt service
to a specific system or a user.

 Network layer
The main objective of network layer is end-to-end packet delivery. Functions of the
network layer are routing, flow control, ensures quality of service (QoS). Every node
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maintains routing information about its neighboring nodes in the network. Before
establishing connection, every node identifies which of its neighbors should be the next
link in the path towards the destination. An attacker in the path can drastically alter
routing by either redirecting the packets in the wrong direction or by broadcasting
incorrect routing information to its neighbors. Following are the possible attacks
associated with the network layer.
 Hole attack

In the hole attack the node which pretends is called a hole. There are various types of
hole attacks such as Black hole attack, Gray hole attack, Worm hole attack. Black hole
attack is defined as attack in which the malicious node attracts/request packets from
every other node and drops all the packets. The gray hole attack is defined as the attack
in which the malicious node selectively drops the packets. The worm hole attack is
defined as the attack in which the malicious user uses two pairs of nodes and there exist
a private connection between the two pairs. The worm hole attack is a considered as
dangerous attack amongst all. It can prevent route discovery where the source and the
destination are more than two hops away. Protocols like Ariadne or secure AODV
prevents such types of [2] [3].
 Ripple effect attack

The main objective of the malicious node is to provide wrong channel information so
that the other nodes change their channel. This false information will transmit on hop
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by hop basis and in turn the entire network will come to a confusing state. This can
disrupt the traffic for long time.

 Transport layer
The transport layer is responsible for transfer of data between two end hosts. It is
responsible for flow control, congestion control and end-to-end error recovery. Some
attacks occur during session setup, while others happen during the period of sessions.
Following are the attacks associated with this layer [2] [3].
 Key depletion attack

Sessions in cognitive networks last only for a short period of time due to frequently
occurring retransmissions. Therefore, large numbers of sessions are being initiated.
Security protocols at the transport layer like SSL and TLS establish cryptographic keys
at the beginning of every transport layer session. Since numbers of sessions in cognitive
networks are large, large numbers of keys are established, thereby increasing the
probability of using the same key twice. Key repetitions can be exploited to break the
underlying cipher system. The WEP and TKIP protocols used in IEEE 802.11 are more
prone to key repetition attacks [2] [3].

 Application layer
It is the top most layer of the protocol stack. It provides application services to the end
users. Protocols that run at the application layer completely rely on the services
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provided by the underlying lower layers. As a result, any attack on physical, link,
network or transport layers may have an adverse affect on the application layer [2] [3].

2.3 Security mechanisms
In this section we describe the security mechanisms and the architecture at different
protocol layers.

 Physical layer
The security concerns mainly lies in the process of spectrum sensing. Factors such as,
location of the transmitter, received signal strength can be used to identify attackers at
this layer. In order to decide the location of the CR users in the network, Localization
techniques can be used. There are various localization techniques which are listed as
follows.
 Range based localization: The travel time of the signal from source to
destination is used to calculate the position.

 Range free Localization: First we calculate the total number of hops in the
network and then we convert it into physical distance.

In order to locate the transmitter Received signal strength can also be used. In
practice location information and the received signal strength are used together to
detect the intruder. Two schemes based on RSS are used to detect the intruder:
Distance ratio Test (DRT), Distance Difference Test (DDT) [3].
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 Link Layer
MAC address is examined at this layer. Each channel has its own schedule for
transmission. Unusual activity results when an adversary does not follow its schedule.
Also the average packet rate is monitored. If the packet rate is higher and last for long
period, then there is a possibility of some unusual activity [3].

 Network Layer
Routing information can be encrypted using cryptographic protocols and authentication
can be used to confirm the integrity of routing table and identity of the nodes. The
scheme of watch dog can be implemented to monitor the data packets passing through
the network [3].
Packet
Node 3

Packet
Node 2

Node 1

Normal Behavior
Malicious
User
Packet

Packet
Node 3

Node 2

Node 1

Abnormal Behavior

Figure 2.4. Intrusion detection at network layer [3].

For example, Fig. 2.4 shows the normal and abnormal behavior at the network layer. In
case of normal behavior, the packets are passed from node1 to node2 and then to node3.
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In abnormal behavior node2 acts as a malicious node, that is it will either change the
contents of the packets or just drop the packet after receiving from node1. As a result
node 3 will get the altered packet or will never get the packet. The concept of watch dog
is used to buffer the packet at node1. Node3 after receiving the packet will compare it
with the buffered one. If there is any difference, it is regarded as abnormal activity and
a log is created for further processing [3].

 Transport Layer
The round trip time and the number of frequent retransmissions are monitored. If the
retransmissions are occurring very frequently or the round trip time is longer than the
average value, then we can say that there is some unusual activity in the network. An
intrusion detection scheme based on RSS and RTT detection can be used to detect
attacks at this layer [3].

 Application Layer
Since the activity of other protocol layers may affect each other, so at this layer the
multiple protocol layers can be monitored or data can be analyzed. For example if an
application creates many connections without any real operations, such abnormal
activity can be easily detected at application layer [3].

2.4 Summary
In this chapter we discuss about the security and its requirement in CR networks. This
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chapter relates to the characteristics of different protocol layers. We have also discussed
the security mechanisms for different protocol layers.
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Chapter 3. Performance Study for Primary
User Emulation Attack in Spectrum
Sensing Networks
3.1 Introduction
Security issues in cognitive radio networks are drawing more attention in recent years.
Major issue associated with spectrum sensing is, how accurately it can differentiate
incumbent signals from secondary user signals? An attacker can easily exploit the
spectrum sensing process. For example, an attacker may imitate as an incumbent
transmitter by transmitting unrecognizable signals in one of the licensed bands, thus
preventing other secondary users from accessing that band [4].

Primary user emulation (PUE) attack is considered to be one of the severe threats to
cognitive radio systems. It poses a great threat to spectrum sensing. In this attack, a
malicious node transmits signals whose characteristics emulate those of incumbent
signals. There are two types of behavior associated with the primary user emulation
attack, which are discussed as follows [4].


Selfish PUE attacks: The main objective is to maximize attacker’s bandwidth.
For an instance, when malicious node identifies vacant band, it will prevent
other secondary users from using that band by transmitting signals that
resembles the incumbent signals [4].
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Malicious PUE attack: The main objective is to obstruct the secondary users
from identifying and using vacant spectrum bands. Malicious attacker does not
necessarily use vacant bands for its own communication purposes. It is
important to note that in PUE attacks, malicious nodes only transmit in vacant
bands [4].

3.2 Primary Exclusive Region
One of the deployment schemes in current related research is the primary exclusive
region (PER). It sets a safeguard for primary receivers. The secondary network must be
deployed outside PER. The exclusive zone is also called as keep-out region. It gives
primary receiver a protection area. It is a way of imposing a certain distance on
cognitive users from the primary user thereby reducing interference to the primary
receiver [36]. Within this region cognitive users are not allowed to transmit. This type
of deployment scheme is suitable to a broadcast network. For an instance, network in
which there is one primary transmitter communicating with multiple primary receivers.
TV network or the downlinks in the cellular network are the good examples of a
broadcast network. In such type of networks, primary receivers may be passive devices.
Such a primary-exclusive region has been proposed for the upcoming spectrum sharing
of the TV band [36]. The secondary users are randomly and uniformly distributed
within a network radius from the primary transmitter, outside the PER .

26

3.3 System Model of CRN

R
Ro

Dp
Primary Transmitter
Good Secondary User
Malicious Secondary User
Figure 3.1 System model of CRN [10] [14]

Following assumptions are made for this system model [10] [14].There are M
malicious users in the system and they transmits at power ‘𝑃𝑚 ’. The distance between
primary transmitter & all the users is ‘𝐷𝑝 ’ and transmits at power ‘𝑃𝑡 ’. The position of
secondary user is at the center of the exclusive region. Malicious users are uniformly
distributed in circular region of radius R and are statistically independent of each other.
Co-ordinates of primary transmitter are known to all the users and are fixed at (𝑟𝑝𝑡 ,𝜃𝑝𝑡 ).
The transmission from primary transmitter and malicious users undergo path loss and
log normal shadowing. The path loss exponent chosen for transmission from primary
transmitter is 2 and from malicious user are 4. No malicious users are present within a
circle of radius 𝑅𝑜 , called as the exclusive radius from secondary user. There is no
co-operation between the secondary users.
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3.4 Analytical model
The PDF of the received signal at the secondary user due to transmission by the primary
and the malicious user is calculated.
Consider M malicious users at (𝑟𝑗 ,𝜃𝑗 ) 1≤ 𝑗 ≤ M. The PDF of 𝑟𝑖 is given as [14],
2𝑟

𝑝(𝑟𝑗 ) = R2 −𝑅𝑗 2

𝑅𝑜

𝑜

𝑟

𝑅

(3.9)

𝜃𝑗 is uniformly distributed in (-π, π). The received power at the secondary user from
the primary transmitter is given by,
(𝑝)

𝑝𝑟

= 𝑃𝑡 𝑑𝑝−2 𝐺𝑝 2

(3.10)

Ɛ𝑝

(𝑝)

Where𝐺𝑝 2 = 1010 , 𝜀𝑝 ~𝑁(0, σ2𝑝 ). Since Pt and dp are fixed the PDF of 𝑝𝑟

follows a

log normal distribution and can be written as
𝑝

(𝑃𝑟) (𝛾)

1

= 𝛾𝐴𝜎

Where A =

𝑝 √2𝜋

ln 10
10

exp{−

(10 log10 𝛾 −𝜇𝑝 )
2𝜎𝑝2

2

}

(3.11)

and

𝜇𝑝 = 10𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝑃𝑡 − 20𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝑑𝑝

(3.12)

The total received power at the secondary user from all the malicious users is given by,
(𝑚)

𝑝𝑟

−4 2
= ∑𝑀
𝑗=1 𝑃𝑚 𝐷𝑗 𝐺𝑗

(3.13)

𝐷𝑗 is the distance between the jth malicious user and the secondary user. 𝐺𝑗2 is the
shadowing between the jth malicious user and the secondary user.
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𝜀𝑗

𝐺𝑗2 = 1010 where 𝜀𝑗 ~𝑁(0, σ2𝑚 ). Each term in the right hand side of the Equ. (3.13) is
𝜔𝑗

log normally distributed random variable of the form 10 10 where 𝜔𝑗 ~𝑁(𝜇𝑗 , σ2𝑚 ),
where 𝜇𝑗 is given by ,
𝜇𝑗 = 10𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝑃𝑚 − 40𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝑑𝑗

(3.14)

The PDF of 𝑝𝑟𝑚 conditioned on the positions of all malicious user can be written as,
1

(𝑚)

𝑝𝑥|𝑟 =

exp{−

𝑥𝐴𝜎𝑀 √2𝛱

(10 log10 𝑥 −𝜇𝑀 )2
2
2𝜎𝑀

}

(3.15)

2
r is the vector with elements 𝑟1,𝑟2 ,…,𝑟𝑀 . And 𝜎𝑀
and 𝜇𝑀 are given as,

2
𝜎𝑀

1

= 𝐴2 ln [1 +

2 2
2𝐴 𝜇𝑗
(𝑒 𝐴 𝜎𝑚 −1) ∑𝑀
𝑗=1 𝑒

]

(3.16)

𝐴𝜇𝑗
2
2
𝜇𝑀 = 𝐴 ln ( ∑𝑀
) − 2 (𝜎𝑀
− 𝜎𝑚
)
𝑗=1 𝑒

(3.17)

(∑𝑀
𝑗=1 𝑒

1

𝐴 𝜇𝑗 2
)

𝐴

The PDF of the received power from all the malicious users, 𝑝𝑚 (𝑥), can be obtained by
averaging Equ.(3.15) over 𝑟1,𝑟2 ,…,𝑟𝑀 and is given by,
𝑅

(𝑚)
𝑝𝑚 (𝑥) = ∫𝑅 ∏ 𝑀
𝑗=1 𝑝𝑥|𝑟 (𝑥|𝑟) 𝑝(𝑟𝑗 ) 𝑑𝑟𝑗

(3.18)

𝑜

Evaluating Equ.(3.18) is very complex so it is approximated to be a log normally
distributed random variable with parameters 𝜇𝑥 and 𝜎𝑥 of the form,
𝑝𝑚 (𝑥) =
(𝑚)

If 𝑝𝑟
as ,

1
𝑥𝐴𝜎𝑥 √2𝜋

exp{−

(10 log10 𝑥 −𝜇𝑥 )2
2𝜎𝑥2

}

(3.19)

is a log normally distributed random variable then 𝜎𝑥2 and 𝜇𝑥 can be obtained

29

1

(𝑚)

2

(𝑚)

𝜎𝑥2 = 𝐴2 (ln 𝐸[( 𝑝𝑟 ) ] − 2 ln 𝐸[𝑝𝑟 ])
1

1

(𝑚)

(𝑚)

(3.20)

2

𝜇𝑥 = 𝐴 ( 2 ln 𝐸[ 𝑝𝑟 ] − 2 ln 𝐸 [(𝑝𝑟 ) ] )

(3.21)
(𝑚)

(𝑚)

From Equ.(3.15) The average probability of 𝑝𝑟 , 𝐸[𝑝𝑟 |𝑟] can be written as,
1 2 2
𝜎𝑀

(𝑚)

𝐴 2

E[𝑝𝑟 |𝑟] = 𝑒 𝐴𝜇𝑀 +2𝐴
𝐴2 2

𝐴2

= 𝑒 𝐴𝜇𝑗− 2 𝜎𝑀 + 2

2 +ln 𝑀+
𝜎𝑚

(𝑚)

E[𝑝𝑟 |𝑟] = 𝑀𝑒 𝐴𝜇𝑗 ∗ 𝑒

𝐴

2

1

1 2 2
𝜎𝑀

= 𝑒 𝐴(𝜇𝑗− 2 𝜎𝑀+ 2 𝜎𝑚+𝐴 ln 𝑀)+2𝐴
𝐴2 2
𝜎
2 𝑀

𝐴2

= 𝑒 𝐴𝜇𝑗 + 2

2 +ln 𝑀
𝜎𝑚

𝐴2 𝜎2
𝑚
2

Where,
𝜇𝑗 = 10𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝑃𝑚 – 40𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝐷𝑗 = 10 log10 (𝑃𝑚 ∗ 𝐷𝑗−4 )
−4

𝑒 𝐴𝜇𝑗 = 𝑒 𝐴10 log10(𝑃𝑚∗𝐷𝑗

)

(𝑚)

−4

= 1010 log10(𝑃𝑚∗𝐷𝑗

E[𝑝𝑟 |𝑟] = M 𝑃𝑚 ∗ 𝐷𝑗−4 ∗ 𝑒

) /10

2
𝐴2 𝜎𝑚
2

Integrating above equation over 𝑟1, 𝑟2 , …, 𝑟𝑀 ,

(𝑚)
𝐸[𝑝𝑟 ]

𝑅

= ∫ M 𝑝(𝑟𝑗 )
𝑅𝑜

= 𝑀𝑃𝑚 𝑒

2
𝐴2 𝜎𝑚
2

𝑃𝑚 𝐷𝑗−4

𝑅

∫
𝑅𝑜

2
𝐴2 𝜎𝑚
2
𝑒

𝑑𝑟𝑗

2𝑟𝑗
∗ 𝐷𝑗−4 𝑑𝑟𝑗
R2 − 𝑅𝑜2

Since secondary user is at position (0, 0), 𝐷𝑗 = 𝑟𝑗 .

(𝑚)
𝐸[𝑝𝑟 ]

=

2
𝐴2 𝜎𝑚
𝑀𝑃𝑚 𝑒 2

𝑅

∫
𝑅𝑜

𝑅2

2𝑟𝑗
1
∗ 4 𝑑𝑟𝑗
2
− 𝑅𝑜 𝑟𝑗

= 𝑃𝑚 ∗ 𝐷𝑗−4
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2
𝐴2 𝜎𝑚

𝑅
𝑀𝑃𝑚 𝑒 2
1
= 2
(2)
∫
2 𝑑𝑟𝑗
𝑅 − 𝑅𝑜2
𝑅𝑜 𝑟𝑗

=

=

=
(𝑚)
𝐸[𝑝𝑟 ]

𝑀𝑃𝑚 𝑒

𝐴2 𝜎2
𝑚
2

𝑅 2 − 𝑅𝑜2

𝑀𝑃𝑚 𝑒

𝐴2 𝜎2
𝑚
2

𝑅 2 − 𝑅𝑜2

𝑀𝑃𝑚 𝑒

1

𝐴2 𝜎2
𝑚
2

𝑅 2 − 𝑅𝑜2

1

(2) [2 [𝑅2 −

1
𝑅𝑜2

]]

(−1) 𝑅𝑜2 −𝑅 2

(2) [

2

[ 𝑅2 𝑅2 ]]
𝑜

𝑅2 − 𝑅2

[ 𝑅2 𝑅2𝑜 ]
𝑜

2
𝑀𝑃𝑚 𝐴2 𝜎𝑚
2
= 2 2𝑒
𝑅 𝑅𝑜

3.5 Neyman-Pearson Criterion for Detecting PUEA
The two hypothesis in Neyman-Pearson decision criterion are given as follows,

M1 : Primary Transmission in progress

M2 : Emulation attack in progress

There are two types of errors that secondary user can make in this hypothesis test.

False alarm: The secondary makes a decision that the transmission is due to primary
but the malicious user is transmitting.

Miss Detection: The secondary makes a decision that the transmission is due to
malicious user but the primary is transmitting.

The power of the received signal is measured in order to calculate the decision variable
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which is given by the ratio of Λ,
𝑝(𝑚) (𝑥)
𝛬 = (𝑃 )
𝑝 𝑟 (𝑥)
Where 𝑝(𝑚) (𝑥) is defined in Equation (3.19) and 𝑝(𝑃𝑟 ) (𝑥) is defined in Equation
(3.11). Λ is then compared with predefined threshold and the secondary decides the
following
Λ ≤ λ D1 : Primary transmission
Λ ≥ λ D2 : PUEA in progress

First, secondary user may decide D2 when M1 is true, and second secondary user may
decide that D1 when M2 is true. Each of these errors has a probability associated with it
which depends on the decision rule and condition densities.

Miss Probability: P{D2|M1} = Probability of making decision D2 when M1 is true.

False Alarm Probability: P{D1|M2} = Probability of making decision D1 when M2 is
true.

In terms of conditional densities these probabilities can be expressed as

𝑃{𝐷2 |𝑀1 } = ∫ 𝑝(𝑃𝑟) (𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = 𝛼
Λ≥λ

𝑃{𝐷1 |𝑀2 } = ∫ 𝑝(𝑚) (𝑥)𝑑𝑥
Λ≤λ
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Figure 3.2 Decision Rule

Fig. 3.2 is a plot for Decision Rule showing Miss Probability and Probability of false
alarm under Gaussian distribution. As shown in the figure, we can see the two
conditional densities of the power received by the good secondary user from primary
and malicious transmitters. The decision rule is then compared with the threshold value;
Lambda (λ) and the two probabilities viz. miss probability and probability of false
alarm are calculated accordingly.
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3.6 Computed simulation Results and observations

Figure 3.3 PDF of received power at the secondary receiver: Pr_p

Fig. 3.3 shows the Probability Density Function (pdf) of the received power at the
secondary user when the primary transmitter is at distance 100Km, Primary transmitter
power 𝑃𝑡 =100Kw, 𝜎𝑚 = 5.5dB, 𝜎𝑝 = 8dB, 𝑅0 = 30m, R= 1000m, 𝑃𝑚 = 4W. Probability
Density Function of Received power is calculated for 10000 times. Both simulated and
computed PDF are plotted in the same figure for easy comparision. Matlab simulation
code can be found in Appendix A.
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Figure 3.4 PDF of received power at the secondary receiver: Pr_m

Fig. 3.4 shows the Probability Density Function of the received power at the secondary
user due to malicious users with Primary transmitter power 𝑃𝑡 =100Kw, 𝜎𝑚 =5.5dB,
𝜎𝑝 =8dB, 𝑅0 = 30m, R= 200m, 𝑃𝑚 = 4W. Probability Density Function of Received
power is calculated for 10000 numbers of simulations. Numbers of malicious users
chosen are 10 and are randomly distributed in the outer radius. Matlab simulation code
can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 3.5 PDF of received signal power in dB at the secondary receiver due to primary
transmitter and malicious user.

Fig. 3.5 shows the probability density plot of received signal power in dB at the
secondary user due to primary transmitter and malicious user for M=5, R=400m,
𝑅0 =30m, 𝑃𝑡 =100Kw, 𝑃𝑚 =4w, 𝜎𝑚 = 5.5dB, 𝜎𝑝 = 8dB. To get the statistics we run the
simulation over 10000 times. Matlab simulation code can be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 3.6 Ratio of received power due to malicious user over received power due to
Primary transmitter

Fig. 3.6 shows the plot for Ratio of Received power in dB due to malicious users over
Received power due to Primary transmitter, The radius of outer region is R=400m,
Radius of primary exclusive region 𝑅0 =30m, primary transmitter power 𝑃𝑡 =100Kw,
Malicious transmitter power is 𝑃𝑚 =4w, 𝜎𝑚 = 5.5dB, 𝜎𝑝 =8dB. We run the simulation for
10000 times. The number of malicious users in this case is M=5. Matlab simulation
code can be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 3.7 Probability of miss detection

Fig. 3.7 is the plot for the probability of miss detection. The number of malicious users
in this case is set to be M=5, The radius of outer region R=100m, Radius of primary
exclusive region 𝑅0 =30m, primary transmitter power 𝑃𝑡 =100Kw, Malicious
transmitter power 𝑃𝑚 =4w, 𝜎𝑚 =5.5dB, 𝜎𝑝 = 8dB. Probability of miss detection is
calculated for 500 times of simulations. The threshold value chosen for above
simulation is set to 2, i.e. λ=2. Matlab simulation code can be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 3.8 Probability of false alarm

Fig. 3.8 shows the plot for probability of False Alarm. The number of malicious users in
this case is M=10, The radius of outer region R=100m, Radius of primary exclusive
region 𝑅0 =30m, primary transmitter power 𝑃𝑡 =100Kw, Malicious transmitter power
𝑃𝑚 =4w, 𝜎𝑚 =5.5dB, 𝜎𝑝 = 8dB. Probability of False Alarm is calculated for 500 numbers
of simulations. The threshold value chosen for above simulation is set to 2 i.e. λ=2.
Matlab simulation code can be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 3.9 Probability of miss detection and false alarm

Fig. 3.9 shows the plot for probability of miss detection and false alarm for, The radius
of outer region is R=100m, Radius of primary exclusive region 𝑅0 =30m, primary
transmitter power 𝑃𝑡 =100Kw, Malicious transmitter power is 𝑃𝑚 =4w, 𝜎𝑚 =5.5dB, 𝜎𝑝 =
8dB. Probability of miss detection and false alarm are calculated for 500 numbers of
simulations. The threshold value chosen for above simulation is set to 2 i.e. λ=2. The
number of malicious users in this case is M=5. Matlab simulation code can be found in
Appendix C.
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Case Study : Lambda(λ)= 2
The following table shows the probabilities of false alarm and miss detection of
primary receiver with different range of R.

R(meters)
P_D1_H2
P_D2_H1

100
0.2728
0.317

R(meters)
P_D1_H2
P_D2_H1

100
0.4054
0.3681

R(meters)
P_D1_H2
P_D2_H1

100
0.1498
0.7825

Number Of malicious users, M = 5
Threshold Value, Lambda(λ)= 2
200
300
400
500
0.0765
0.0486
0.3172
0.026
0.0713
0.0373
0.1858
0.0203
Number Of malicious users, M = 10
Threshold Value, Lambda(λ)= 2
200
300
400
500
0.4631
0.1458
0.0291 0.0288
0.3338
0.1041
0.0264 0.0223
M = 15
Lambda = 2
200
300
400
500
0.1997
0.2661
0.0948 0.0062
0.1558
0.1761
0.0698 0.0075

600
0.0015
0.0016

700
5.71E-04
6.60E-04

600
0.0013
0.0017

700
0.001
0.0011

600
0.0869
0.072

700
0.0204
0.0177

3.7 Summary
In this chapter we have studied the analytical model for the primary user emulation
attack in cognitive radio network. We have done a detailed analysis and simulation of
the network for PUE attack. Simulations were carried out to determine the performance
of the network for PUE attack in terms of probabilities of miss detection and false alarm.
We discussed various results for our simulations and provided our Matlab codes for the
simulations in the attached Appendices.
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Chapter 4. Proposed PUE Attack Model
with Maximum Likelihood Criterion
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 deals with the performance study of the analytical model for PUEA in
cognitive radio. In this chapter we propose a new model for PUEA in CR network.
Following assumptions are made for the new system model.

1. There are M malicious users in the network and are randomly and uniformly
distributed in the circular region.
2. There are two primary transmitters 𝑃𝑡1 & 𝑃𝑡2 , separated by a fixed distance
and their transmission are independent.
3. The distance between secondary user and 𝑃𝑡1 is 𝐷𝑝1 , The distance between
secondary user and 𝑃𝑡2 is 𝐷𝑝2 .

4. No malicious user is present between within the exclusive region for the
secondary user.

5. All the users in the network know about the location of primary transmitters.

6. The RF signals from primary and malicious transmitters undergo path loss and
log normal shadowing.
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7. The position of the good secondary user changes, it moves away from primary
transmiiter1 towards primary transmitter 2.

4.2 Proposed System Model

R

Ro

Dp1

Dp2
Primary Transmitter 2

Primary Transmitter 1
Malicious Secondary User

Good Secondary User

Figure 4.1 Proposed system model
There are M malicious users in the system which transmits at power ‘𝑃𝑚 ’. The primary
transmitter 𝑃𝑡1 is at distance ‘𝐷𝑝1 ’ and the primary transmitter 𝑃𝑡2 is at distance
‘𝐷𝑝2 ’ from all the users and transmits at power ‘𝑃𝑡 ’. The positions of secondary and
malicious users are uniformly distributed in circular region of radius R and are
statistically independent of each other. Position of primary transmitter is known to all
the users and is fixed at (𝑟𝑝 ,𝜃𝑝 ). The RF signals from primary transmitter and malicious
users undergo path loss and log normal shadowing. The path loss exponent for
transmission from primary transmitter is 2 and that from malicious user is 4. For any
secondary user fixed at co-ordinates(r,𝜃) no malicious users are present within a circle
of radius 𝑅𝑜 which is called the exclusive radius from secondary user. There is no
co-operation between the secondary users.

The received power at the secondary user from the primary transmitter1 is given by,
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(𝑝1)

𝑝𝑟

−2
= 𝑃𝑡1 𝑑𝑝1
𝐺𝑝1 2

The received power at the secondary user from the primary transmitter1 is given by,
(𝑝2)

𝑝𝑟

−2
= 𝑃𝑡2 𝑑𝑝2
𝐺𝑝2 2

(𝑝)

The total power at receivers is then given by, 𝑝𝑟

(𝑝1)

= 𝑝𝑟

(𝑝2)

+ 𝑝𝑟

due to their

independence.

The total received power at the secondary user from all the malicious users is given by,
(𝑚)

𝑝𝑟

−4 2
= ∑𝑀
𝑗=1 𝑃𝑚 𝐷𝑗 𝐺𝑗

(𝑝)

PDF of 𝑝𝑟
𝑝

(𝑃𝑟) (𝛾)

follows a log normal distribution and can be written as
1

= 𝛾𝐴𝜎

𝑝 √2𝜋

(𝑚)

exp{−

(10 log10 𝛾 −𝜇𝑝 )

2

2𝜎𝑝2

}

PDF of 𝑝𝑟

follows a log normal distribution and can be written as

𝑝𝑚 (𝑥) =

1
𝑥𝐴𝜎𝑥 √2𝜋

exp{−

(10 log10 𝑥 −𝜇𝑥 )2
2𝜎𝑥2

}
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4.3 Computed simulation results and observations

Figure 4.2 Probability for miss detection

Fig. 4.2 shows a sample plot of probability for miss detection. The number of malicious
users in this case is M=10, The radius of outer region R=200m, Radius of primary
exclusive region 𝑅0 =30m, primary transmitter power 𝑃𝑡1 = 100𝐾𝑤 , primary
transmitter power 𝑃𝑡2 = 50𝐾𝑤 , Malicious transmitter power 𝑃𝑚 =4w, 𝜎𝑚1 = 8𝑑𝐵,
𝜎𝑚2 = 10𝑑𝐵 . Probability of miss detection is calculated for 1000 numbers of
simulations. It is observed that the probability of miss detection shows randomness
between the range of 0.1 and 0.36. Matlab simulation code can be found in Appendix D.
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Figure 4.3 Average probability for miss detection and false alarm

Fig. 4.3 is the plot for average probability for miss detection and false alarm. The
number of malicious users in this case is M=10, The radius of outer region R=200m,
Radius of primary exclusive region 𝑅0 =30m, primary transmitter power 𝑃𝑡1 =
100𝐾𝑤 , primary transmitter power 𝑃𝑡2 = 100𝐾𝑤 , Malicious transmitter power
𝑃𝑚 =4w, 𝜎𝑚1 = 8𝑑𝐵 , 𝜎𝑚2 = 8𝑑𝐵 . It is noted that the probability curves show
symmetric around 75Km, because we set up two transmitters equally. Matlab
simulation code can be found in Appendix D.
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Figure 4.4 Average probability for miss detection and false alarm

Fig. 4.4 shows the plot for average probability for miss detection and false alarm. The
number of malicious users in this case is M=10, The radius of outer region R=200m,
Radius of primary exclusive region 𝑅0 =30m, primary transmitter power 𝑃𝑡1 =
100𝐾𝑤 , primary transmitter power 𝑃𝑡2 = 50𝐾𝑤 , Malicious transmitter power
𝑃𝑚 =4w, 𝜎𝑚1 = 8𝑑𝐵, 𝜎𝑚2 = 10𝑑𝐵. It is observed that the probability of false alarm
does not change too much over the distance 50Km to 100Km. But the probability of
miss detection decrease with the distance. Matlab simulation code can be found in
Appendix D.
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4.4 Summary
In this chapter we have discussed about the proposed network for the primary user
emulation attack in cognitive radio network. We have done a detailed analysis and
simulation of the network for PUE attack. Simulations were carried out to determine
the performance of the proposed system model for PUEA attack in terms of
probabilities of miss detection and false alarm. We showed various simulation results
under different configuration of primary transmitters. Matlab codes for the simulations
are attached in Appendices.

48

Chapter 5. Conclusion
In this MS thesis research, I have first investigated the general concepts of security
threats to the cognitive radio networks. Then, I studied the performances for primary
user emulation attacks from Neyman-Pearson criterion point of view. After that , I
proposed a novel system model with different configurations of the primary users and
conduct research on maximum likelihood criterion. Our experimental results
demonstrate the statistical characteristics of the probability of false alarm and miss
detection in the proposed system. I plan to make comprehensive performance
comparison with existing research results in the future work.
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Appendix A
%Matlab code for Received power by secondary User due to primary
Transmitter %
% Primary Transmitter power = 100Kwatts
% Malicious Transmitter Power = 4watts
% Network Radius = 1000m
% Distance between Primary transmitter and good secondary user = 100Km
clear all;
close all;
clc;
num_run = 10000; %testing times
format long;
R =1000; %radius of outer circle, changable 30:30:1500 meter
R0 = 30;%radiu of inner circle
sigma_p = 8; %fixed value
sigma_m = 5.5; %fixed value
Pt = 100e3; %%%%%% Primary transmitting power = 100 Kw
Pm = 4; % malicious user transmitting power
dp = 100e3; %%%%% distance between primary transmitter and secondary user
M = 15; %%%% number of malicious users
A = log(10)/10;
E_p = sigma_p*randn(1,num_run);
Gp = 10.^(E_p/10);
Pr_p_tmp = Pt*Gp*dp^(-2); %r. v. received power
Pr_p = sort(Pr_p_tmp);
mu_p = 10*log10(Pt) - 20*log10(dp);
mu_p_2 = (10^(mu_p/10))^2;
P_gama =
(1./(A*Pr_p*sigma_p*sqrt(2*pi))).*exp(-((10*log10(Pr_p)-mu_p)/(sqrt(2)*sigma_p))
.^2);
figure(1)
[f2,x2] = hist(Pr_p_tmp,4000);
bar(x2,f2/trapz(x2,f2));
axis([0 1e-4 0 max(P_gama)]);
grid on, hold on;
xlabel('Received power at the secondary receiver: Pr\_p')
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ylabel('Probability density function of Pr\_p')
plot(Pr_p, P_gama,'r');
axis([0 1e-4 0 max(P_gama)])
legend('simulation', 'computation' )
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Appendix B

% Matlab code for Received power by secondary User due to Malicious Users %
clear all;
close all;
clc;
num_run = 10000; %testing times
format long;
R =1000; %radius of outer circle, changeable 30:30:1500 meter
R0 = 30;
%radius of inner circle
sigma_p = 8; %fixed value
sigma_m = 5.5; %fixed value
Pt = 100e3; %%%%%% Primary transmitting power = 100 Kw
Pm = 4; %malicious user transmitting power
dp = 100e3; %%%%% distance between primary transmitter and secondary user
M = 10; %%%% number of malicious users
A = log(10)/10;
%%%% Random Points within circle with radius R & radius R0
xCoordinates = [];
yCoordinates = [];
n = M;
while n > 0
x = unifrnd(-R,R,1,1);
y = unifrnd(-R,R,1,1);
norms = sqrt((x.^2) + (y.^2));
inBounds = find((R0 <= norms) & (norms <= R));
xCoordinates = [xCoordinates; x(inBounds)];
yCoordinates = [yCoordinates; y(inBounds)];

n = M - numel(xCoordinates);
end
%%%%%%%%% Distance between jth malicious user and secondary
user %%%%%%%
for i= 1 : M % number of malicious users
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d(i)=sqrt((xCoordinates(i))^2 + (yCoordinates(i))^2);
end
%%%%% Received power at secondary user from malicious users %%%%%%
for kk = 1:num_run
E_j= sigma_m*randn(M,1);
G = 10.^(E_j/10);
for j = 1:M
P(j) = Pm*(d(j)^(-4))*G(j);
end
Pr_m_tmp(kk)= sum(P);
end
Pr_m = sort(Pr_m_tmp);
[f1,x1] = hist(Pr_m_tmp,4000);
figure(2)
bar(x1,f1/trapz(x1,f1));
axis([0 max(x1) 0 max(f1/trapz(x1,f1))])
grid on; hold on;
xlabel('Received power at the secondary receiver from malicious users: Pr\_m')
ylabel('simulated pdf. Probability density function of Pr\_m')
sigma_x_2 = (1/A^2)*(log(mean(Pr_m.^2)) - 2*log(mean(Pr_m)));
mu_x = (1/A)*(2*log(mean(Pr_m)) - 0.5*log(mean(Pr_m.^2)));
P_m_gama =
(1./(A*Pr_m*sqrt(sigma_x_2)*sqrt(2*pi))).*exp(-((10*log10(Pr_m)-mu_x)).^2/(2*si
gma_x_2)); %Equ (11)
plot(Pr_m, P_m_gama,'r-.');
xlabel('Received power at the secondary receiver from malicious users: ')
ylabel('calculated pdf')% axis([0 max(Pr_m) 0 max(P_m_gama)])
legend('simulation', 'computation' )

53

Appendix C

% Matlab code for Calculating Probabilities of false alarm and miss detection %
clear all;
close all;
clc;
P_D1_H2=[];
P_D2_H1=[];
num_run = 10000; %testing times
M = 15; %%%% number of malicious users
R =500; %radius of outer circle, changeable 30:30:1500 meter
R0 = 30;%radiu of inner circle
sigma_p = 8; %fixed dB
sigma_m = 5.5; %fixed value dB
sigma_p_2= (10^(sigma_p/10))^2;
sigma_m_2= (10^(sigma_m/10))^2;
Pt = 100e3; %%%%%% Primary transmitting power = 100 Kw
Pm = 4; %malicious user transmitting power 40watts
dp = 100e3; %%%%% distance between primary transmitter and secondary user
A = log(10)/10;
x0 = 1e-9:1e-9:1e-3; %all x axis variables
%%%% Random Points within circle with radius R & radius R0
xCoordinates = [];
yCoordinates = [];
n = M;
while n > 0
x = unifrnd(-R,R,1,1);
y = unifrnd(-R,R,1,1);
norms = sqrt((x.^2) + (y.^2));
inBounds = find((R0 <= norms) & (norms <= R));
xCoordinates = [xCoordinates; x(inBounds)];
yCoordinates = [yCoordinates; y(inBounds)];
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n = M - numel(xCoordinates);
end
%%%%%%%%% Distance between jth malicious user and secondary
user %%%%%%%
for i= 1 : M % number of malicious users
d(i)=sqrt((xCoordinates(i))^2 + (yCoordinates(i))^2);
end
N=500; %N loop numbers
for J=1:1:N
%%%%% Received power at secondary user from primary transmitter %%%%%%
E_p = sigma_p*randn(1,num_run); %E_p dB in lognormal distribution
Gp = 10.^(E_p/10);
Pr_p_tmp = Pt*Gp*dp^(-2); %r. v. received power (watts) r.v.
Pr_p = sort(Pr_p_tmp);
mean_Pr_p=mean(10*log10((Pr_p))); %mean power in dB
mu_p = 10*log10(Pt) - 20*log10(dp); %calculation=mean(Pr_p) in db =mean_Pr_p
mu_p_2 = (10^(mu_p/10))^2;
P_gama =
(1./(A*x0*sigma_p*sqrt(2*pi))).*exp(-((10*log10(x0)-mu_p)/(sqrt(2)*sigma_p)).^2);
%%%%% Received power at secondary user from Malicious users %%%%%%
for kk = 1:num_run
E_j= sigma_m*randn(M,1);
G = 10.^(E_j/10);
P = Pm*d.^(-4).*G';
Pr_m_tmp(kk)= sum(P);
end
Pr_m = sort(Pr_m_tmp);
sigma_x_2 = (1/A^2)*(log(mean(Pr_m.^2)) - 2*log(mean(Pr_m)));
mu_x = (1/A)*(2*log(mean(Pr_m)) - 0.5*log(mean(Pr_m.^2)));
P_m_gama =
(1./(A*x0*sqrt(sigma_x_2)*sqrt(2*pi))).*exp(-((10*log10(x0)-mu_x)).^2/(2*sigma_x
_2)); %Equ (11) same x0
z= P_m_gama./P_gama;
lambda=2;
index= max(find(z >= lambda));
x_threshold = x0(index);
t0=1e-9:1e-9:x_threshold; %t0 is from 0 to lamdba
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P_D2_H1_tmp = trapz(t0,P_gama(1:index));
P_D2_H1=[P_D2_H1;P_D2_H1_tmp];
tt_size= round((1e-3-x0(index))/1e-9); %tt is index from lambda to right end value
tt = x0(index+(1:1:tt_size));
P_D1_H2_tmp = trapz(tt,P_m_gama(index+(1:1:tt_size)));
P_D1_H2 =[P_D1_H2; P_D1_H2_tmp];
% close all
end;
P_D1=sort(P_D1_H2);
P_D2=sort(P_D2_H1);
plot(P_D1, (0:1/N:1-1/N), 'r', P_D2, (0:1/N:1-1/N),'k');
xlabel('Probability of miss detection and false alarm M=10, R=700m, R_0=30m ')
ylabel('CDF')
legend('P\_D1', 'P\_D2' );
MeanP_D1=mean(P_D1_H2)
MeanP_D2=mean(P_D2_H1)
figure (2)
plot(P_D1_H2)
xlabel('Number of simulation times ')
ylabel('Probability of False alarm')
figure (3)
plot(P_D2_H1)
xlabel('Number of simulation times ')
ylabel('Probability of Miss Detection')
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Appendix D
% Matlab code for Chapter 4 %
clear all;
close all;
clc;
MeanP_D1=[];
MeanP_D2=[];
num_run = 5000; %testing times
N=100; %N loop numbers
M = 10; %%%% number of malicious users
R =200; %radius of outer circle, changeable 30:30:1500 meter
R0 = 30;%radius of inner circle
sigma_p1 = 8; %fixed dB
sigma_p2 = 10; %fixed dB
sigma_m = 5.5; %fixed value dB
sigma_p1_2= (10^(sigma_p1/10))^2;
sigma_p2_2= (10^(sigma_p2/10))^2;
xCoordinates = [];
yCoordinates = [];
n = M;
while n > 0
x = unifrnd(-R,R,1,1);
y = unifrnd(-R,R,1,1);
norms = sqrt((x.^2) + (y.^2));
inBounds = find((R0 <= norms) & (norms <= R));
xCoordinates = [xCoordinates; x(inBounds)];
yCoordinates = [yCoordinates; y(inBounds)];
n = M - numel(xCoordinates);
end
%%%%%%%%% Distance between jth malicious user and secondary
user %%%%%%%
for i= 1 : M % number of malicious users
d(i)=sqrt((xCoordinates(i))^2 + (yCoordinates(i))^2);
end
sigma_m_2= (10^(sigma_m/10))^2;
Pt1 = 100e3; %%%%%% Primary transmitting power = 100 Kw
Pt2 = 50e3; %%%%%% Primary transmitting power = 100 Kw
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A = log(10)/10;
x0 = 1e-9:1e-9:1e-3; %all x axis variables
Pm = 4; %malicious user transmitting power 40watts
for dp1 = 1e3*(50:5:100); %%%%% distance between primary transmitter and
secondary user
P_D1_H2=[]; %initialize at a new location of d1
P_D2_H1=[];
dp2=150e3 - dp1
for J=1:1:N
%%%%% Received power at secondary user from primary transmitter %%%%%%
E_p1 = sigma_p1*randn(1,num_run); %E_p dB in lognormal distribution
Gp1 = 10.^(E_p1/10);
Pr_p_tmp1 = Pt1*Gp1*dp1^(-2); %r. v. received power (watts) r.v.
E_p2 = sigma_p2*randn(1,num_run); %E_p dB in lognormal distribution
Gp2 = 10.^(E_p2/10);
Pr_p_tmp2 = Pt2*Gp2*dp2^(-2); %r. v. received power (watts) r.v.
Pr_p_tmp=Pr_p_tmp1+Pr_p_tmp2;
Pr_p = sort(Pr_p_tmp);
mean_Pr_p=mean(10*log10((Pr_p))); %mean power in dB
mu_p1 = 10*log10(Pt1) - 20*log10(dp1); %calculation=mean(Pr_p) in db
=mean_Pr_p
mu_p2 = 10*log10(Pt2) - 20*log10(dp2); %calculation=mean(Pr_p) in db
=mean_Pr_p
mu_p= mu_p1+mu_p2;
mu_p_2 = (10^(mu_p/10))^2;
sigma_p12 = (1/A^2)*(log(mean(Pr_p.^2)) - 2*log(mean(Pr_p)));
P_gama =
(1./(A*x0*sigma_p12*sqrt(2*pi))).*exp(-((10*log10(x0)-mu_p)/(sqrt(2)*sigma_p12)
).^2);
%%%%% Received power at secondary user from Malicious users %%%%%%
for kk = 1:num_run
E_j= sigma_m*randn(M,1);
G = 10.^(E_j/10);
P = Pm*d.^(-4).*G';
Pr_m_tmp(kk)= sum(P);
end
Pr_m = sort(Pr_m_tmp);
sigma_x_2 = (1/A^2)*(log(mean(Pr_m.^2)) - 2*log(mean(Pr_m)));
%Mu_x = 10*log10(Pm) - mean(40*log10(d)); %this mean is not correct.
mu_x = (1/A)*(2*log(mean(Pr_m)) - 0.5*log(mean(Pr_m.^2)));
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P_m_gama =
(1./(A*x0*sqrt(sigma_x_2)*sqrt(2*pi))).*exp(-((10*log10(x0)-mu_x)).^2/(2*sigma_x
_2)); %Equ (11) same x0
z= P_m_gama./P_gama;
semilogx(x0,z); grid on;
lambda=2;
index= max(find(z >= lambda));
x_threshold = x0(index);
t0=1e-9:1e-9:x_threshold; %t0 is from 0 to lamdba
P_D2_H1_tmp = trapz(t0,P_gama(1:index));
P_D2_H1=[P_D2_H1;P_D2_H1_tmp];
tt_size= round((1e-3-x0(index))/1e-9); %tt is index from lambda to right end value
tt = x0(index+(1:1:tt_size));
P_D1_H2_tmp = trapz(tt,P_m_gama(index+(1:1:tt_size)));
P_D1_H2 =[P_D1_H2; P_D1_H2_tmp];
end;
MeanP_D1= [MeanP_D1; mean(P_D1_H2)]
MeanP_D2= [MeanP_D2; mean(P_D2_H1)]
end
plot(50:5:100, MeanP_D1,'r'); hold on; plot(50:5:100, MeanP_D2, '--'); grid on;
xlabel('Distance between Pt1 to the secondary receiver (km) ')
ylabel('Probability of false almarm and miss detection')
axis([50 100 0 0.5]);
legend('P\_D1', 'P\_D2')
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